also.. hmm where have I seen Lori Swanson before, oh yeah (sarcasm(
But relevant to the link posted above I had 30 days to vacate the lease in St Cloud they forced under threat to all of my things held at their Maple Grove home and originally one still living therapy pet. Correction when they filed March 11th I had till the end of the month to vacate because the landlord wasn't happy with nine months of do the impossible remediate are moldy vehicle set Paul and Marlene forced. I had something like 19 days. I have recorded phone calls they knew the car broke down March 6th. They chose to file in Hennepin on March 11th 2020 Hennepin County 4th District Court I have text that demonstrate they were well aware I had to be out of phone calls demonstrating they were well aware why I had to leave this least they forced and that they knew the car was broken down screaming things like you have made me go hungry 30 days already last year because you're demanding this labor and not providing the budget to do it or realization that the conditions you have chosen make it impossible and burning money. But the relevant point above I did not and still don't have a real ability to manage even an appeal I did attempt to contact the court even without covid-19 scared for my life I am terrified
We proceed to analyze whether the ex parte OFP that was served on Phipps and is the basis for his prosecution and conviction is unconstitutionally vague.
The district court’s order finding Phipps guilty is based on paragraph 7 of the ex parte OFP, which states: “IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the following additional relief is granted. No contact in person, by phone, by mail, by third party, or by any other means.” The phrase “no contact” is clear and understandable. The common meaning of the word “contact” is “[a] coming together or touching, as of objects or surfaces,” “[t]he state or condition of touching or of immediate proximity,” or “[c]onnection or interaction; communication.” The American Heritage College Dictionary 299 (3d ed. 2000). Paragraph 7 clearly states that all contact is prohibited. In context with paragraphs 1 and 2, it is obvious that Phipps is prohibited from having contact with Y.S.P. When faced with a challenge to a similar restraining order, the Massachusetts Court of Appeals concluded that “[t]he meaning of the sweeping negative ‘no contact’ . . . seems plain without need for any refined lexical exploration.” Butler, 661 N.E.2d at 667.
Phipps contends that the OFP is vague because it does not expressly state that it prohibits contact even if Y.S.P. first contacts him. In fact, the order does prohibit contact in that situation; it does so because, without qualification or exception, it says that Phipps shall have no contact with Y.S.P. Phipps’s real concern may be the breadth of the no-contact provision. But breadth does not imply vagueness. If anything, the breadth of paragraph 7 undermines Phipps’s vagueness argument because the unqualified nature of the no-contact provision makes it clear that no contact whatsoever is permitted. We need not consider whether a person may be convicted of violating an OFP if the person is completely passive when confronted with a petitioner’s contact and does not reciprocate the petitioner’s first contact. Phipps cannot make such a claim because he apparently spent an entire day with Y.S.P. at his home.
We conclude that the language of paragraph 7 has “sufficient definiteness” such that “ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited.’” Bussmann, 741 N.W.2d at 83 (quoting Kolender, 461 U.S. at 357, 103 S. Ct. at 1858). Thus, the no-contact provision of paragraph 7 is not unconstitutionally vague.
D E C I S I O N
The “no contact” provision in the ex parte order for protection is not void on the ground that it is unconstitutionally vague. Therefore, the district court did not err by denying Phipps’s motion to dismiss.
1The state did not argue that Phipps’s constitutional challenge is barred on the ground that it is an impermissible collateral attack because he did not appeal from the issuance of the ex parte order. See State v. Romine, 757 N.W.2d 884, 890-91 (Minn. App. 2008), review denied (Minn. Feb. 17, 2009). It is unclear whether Phipps had an opportunity to appeal from the issuance of the ex parte OFP. Thus, it is unclear whether Phipps could be precluded from challenging the constitutionality of the ex parte OFP following his conviction for violating that order. See State v. Ness, 819 N.W.2d 219 (Minn. App. 2012).